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Client Confidences and Public Confidence in the Legal Profession:
Observations on the ABA House of Delegates Deliberations
on the Duty of Confidentiality
Irma S. R s . tll*
n August 2001 and February 2002, the American Bar to reject any proposals to revert back to the former rule. In
Association H1ouse of Delegates debated the merits of support of these goals, I set fbrth the points I would have
proposed amendments to the ABA Model Rules of presented at Chicago, urging the delegates to: (1) beware of
Professional Conduct,' completing their work to absolutes and consider proportionality, (2) recognize
update the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, with lawyers as trustworthy decision makers, and (3) acknowl-
the exception of the roles relating to multijurisdictional edge the profession's responsibility io the public.
practice and the unauthorized practice of law.' The ABA (1) BEWARE OF ABSOLUTES AND CONSIDER
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional PROPORTIONALITY
Conduct ("Etics 2000 Commission") proposed revisions to
the Model Rules;3 after four years of study. On this first point, it is important to note
dringthatimels ate foryersion sur. that the duty or confidentiality is one of theDuring that time, the Commissio  stir- 01P - ' ,F "
veyed lawyers and scholars, reviewed for- bedrock principles ollthe legal protesston. It
mal opinions by the ABA Standing Proportionality is a hallmark principle articulates the foutlatiotal duty of lawvyers
Committee on Ethics and Professional of the rule of lawv, to protect client inflonnation. Wlile it is
Responsibility and opinions from state undoubtedly one of the must impottait
disciplinary hoards, conducted hearings . .duties that lawyers owe to their clients, it
regarding the Model Rules, and drafted its L 4 '.-2 ,, has not traditionally been regarded as an
proposed revisions to the Model Rules. absolute.' Those who argue that the duty of
conidentiality should be revered as an absolute value of our
The amendments debated included prop.sd exceptions profession fail to take into account two important qualifiers.
to toe pronuiinon against revealing client inionmaioi set
forth in Model Rule 1.6.4 The House accepted significant
remedial changes, authorizing permissive disclosure when
necessary to prevent "reasonably certain death or substan-
tial bodily harm."5 to "secure legal advice" about conpli-
ance with the Model Rules, and to comply with "other law
or it court order" The House also retained the provision of
the rile that allows lawyers to disclose client information
"to establish a claim or dctL'nse on beliall of the lawyer."
While the significance of thcsc changes should not be
underestimated, the I louse also rejected some important and
beneficial changes proposed by the Commission.
As one of several individuals that the Ethics 2000
Commission asked to testify in support of its proposal to
change Model Rule 1.6, I traveled to Chicago and waited to
speak. I did not speak to the House because delegates
"called the question," obtaining a vote on an amendment to
delete subsection (.b)(2) flona the proposed revision to
Model Rule 1.6.6 1 wrile now to commend both the ABA
I louse of Delegates and the Ethics 2000 Commission on the
important accomplishment they have achieved in the
process of revising the rules and, additionally, to encourage
the I louse to reconsider the proposed (b)(2) and (b)(3) and
First, the general principle of proportionality often
requires the use of meaningful exceptions to balance the
interests at issue in any given doctrine. Proportionalily is a
hallmark principle of the rule of law. After all, cven the First
Atendment to the Constitution is not absolute. It allows for
exceptions, limiting speech to respond to situations of peril.$
By aiending Rule 1.6 to allow lawyers to disclose client
information to prevent reasonably certain death or substan-
tial bodily harn, the House cured the most severe propor-
tionality problem raised by the confidentiality rule.
Nevertheless, the Ilouse's rejection of limited exceptions to
protect third parties and the public in regard to financial and
property interests raises serious questions of proportionality
and the lawyer's role in society, particularly because the pro-
posed exceptions limit disclosures to situations in which a
client used the lawyer's services to commit a crime or fraud.
Specifically, the deletion of the Commission's proposed
subsection (b)(2) at the August meeting presents a partial
triumph ofan absolulist view otconlidentiality. This provi-
sion would have permilted the disclosure of client intorma-
tion by lawyers "'to prevent the client [ruim committing a
crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial injury to the financial interest or property orl anoth-
er" when the client used the lawyer's services to further tie
crime or fraud. After the defeat of subsection (b)(2), the
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Commission withdrew proposed subsection (b)(3), which
would have permitted lawyers to disclose client information
to "mitigate, or rectily substantial injury" in the same cir-
cunstances of use of lawyer scrviccs to further the crime or
fraud. The defbal and withdnwal of these proposed excep-
tions sustains a system that leaves third parties and the pub-
lie at risk of significant harm from represented individuals
who intend harm or act recklessly.9
Knowles outline








By contrast, the current exceptions allow lawyers to Inc very
speak to protect their own interests, to "establish a claim or professional d
defense," without regard to the strength of tile interest or the argue strongly
nature of the threat. The claim or defense asserted need not cotreslnding
be of any pat ticular value: a $5.00 fle meets the test as well attorney-clien
as a $5 million fee. This liberal exception for lawyer self- tit ' to a Clen
interest is in sharp contrst to the I louse's rejection of tle when the clioi
limited protection for third parties and the public,'O even vices to perpe
where the interests at stake tire substantial. For example, discretion to
neither the loss of the family farm nor significant property should be rec
damage caused by an intentional release of hazardous sub- confidentialit
stances is sufficient to trigger protection for third parties. is a iwhole sh
Moreover, Enron employees, who lost
millions of dollars in pensions, lack pro- ppim .:O
tection under this rule, though protection 'i4d 5553195
of the lawyer's fee, no matter how small, Tlihe House of Delegates took
is sufficient to allow disclosure. significant steps toward rejecting an
The rejection and withdrawal of subsee- absolutist version of confidentiality.
tions (2) and (3) leaves third parties and
the public at risk to significant harm from s"
a lauwyer's client. It leaves lawers without U .,.1. .W_1.ON
discretion to reveal infoniation to prevent substantial harn
that would flow front a crime or fraud in which the client
used the lawyer's services. The comparison of these results
offends any serious conception ofprlmportionality of law.
Second, the law of attorney-client privilege, including
the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, may present a
legitimate limitattion on the duty of confidentiality in some
cases. Even an absoltte rule of confidentiality would not
protect against disclosure of criminal or fraudulent conduct,
though it might delay disclosure. For example, if communi-
cations between a lawyer and client are made itt furtherance
of a conspiracy to commit a crime, the communication is
not protected by tile privilege.] I In cases in which criminal
or fraudulent conduct by the client creates a danger oftuture
harmn to tile public or a third pnrty, the attorney-client privi-
lege will not protect client intitnation from ultimate dis-
closure in court. Thus, clients who engage in on-going crim-
inal or frauditcn cunduct have no reasonable expeetation
that the itformation at issue will be protected.
Legal ethics experts debate the issue whether the attor-
ney-client privilege has bearing on the question of the
appropriate scope of the duty of confidentiality. As
Protbssor Hazard has noted, "tle two concepts [of confi-
dentiality and the attortey-client privilege] are linked in
policy and in practical consequences." 2 In tleir arlicle,
Prd*'.ssional , rre(i un i.s K'ceptiems: Smuling V'
Zimwranan R'i.s'ited,13 Roger C. Cnnnion an ti ori P.
the history of the profession's abandon-
tional link betwcen confidentiality and tIle
option to the atttnrncy-client privilege and
ofa pennissive disclosure applicable lo the
alion in order to "rcinrorce[] the lawyer's
only lawful assistance and ads ice to
make explicit the policy relationshtip
ntiality and the exception to the privilege.
policies and purposes that justify the
Luty of confidentiality in the first place
'for a permissive exception to that duty
to the clietit-fraud exception of the
t privilege. Ifa lawyer is required to tes-
t comnticaton, otherwise privileged,
it has sought the lawyer's advice and ser-
trate or continue a fraud, a concomitant
lisclose without lestimonial compulsion
ogniied under the professional duty of
i. Neither the legal profession nor society
ould tolerate a regime in which lawyers
may be used by clients as a means of
carrying out a crime or fraud."'5
The Model Rules provide that the ques-
tion of the existence of atn attorney-client
relationship is to be delennined by refer-
ence to substantive law, "[Flor purposes of
determining the lawyer's authority tnd
responsibility, principles of snbstantive law
external to these Rules determine whether a
client-lawyer relationship exists."I6 The applicable law
regarding the attorney-client relationship includes compo-
nents of agency, fiduciary obligation, and contract aw with
contract law predominating with regard to the relationship
and the expectations of the parties relating to tie rights and
responsibilities that inhere in the relaiotiship. While the duty
ot confidentiality is a core principle of prolessional responsi-
bility, it should not override substantive law or destroy tie
application of public policy and lw to the attorney-client
relationship. A tniistn of contract law is that parties tire
deemed to contract against the backdrop of existing law and
public policy. Moreover, a foundational concept of contract
law is that agreements that are contrary to public policy are
unenforceable. Considerations of attorney-client privilege in
general and the crime-fraud exception in particular are not
irelevant to the question of the reasonable expectations of a
client regarding the duty of contidentiality because no con-
tract should be construed to undermine public policy. This
line of contract analysis suggests that client expectations that
an on-going crime or fraud is protected by the duty ofconli-
dentiality may not be well- li.utdcd.
By its approval of the amendments noted above, tIhe
I lousc of Delegates took significant steps toward rejecting
an absolutist version of confidentiality. The former Model
Rule 1.6 (which was modified by the I louse of Delegate's
recent action) established a vision of confidentiality as a
near absohtte when comparing ctients' interests with those
of third parties and the public. The strength of the former
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Rule 1.6, which is still the rule in some jurisdictions, is
clear. Its prohibition against disclosure ofelient information
is broad and its exception to protect third parties is narrow.
It allows disclosure only when a mulli-faclor test is met: the
lawyer has knowledge that the client (not some other party)
is going to commit a crime that is likely to result in immi-
nenl death or substantial bodily harm.17 The problem is that
the test pairs two imponderables: whether the most disas-
trous effect (imminent death or substantial bodily harm) will
ensue and whether the most reprehensible conduct (a crime)
will be utiliiycd and gives the lawyer no discretion to dis-
close client information unless these two imponderables
coalesce. These questions have no answers until a trial
establishes the necessary elements.
The current Rule 1.6 retains elements of this absolutist
:,nnrct,| It lither reauires nnr erncoura,'ns dtisehosuirL' no
nificant harm.19 Lawyers have significant training and skill in
applying factual tests. The ABA should trust them to apply a
balanced rule with permissive exceptions. It should invest
lawyers with discretion to judge the factual situations tlt jus-
tify disclosure of client information and it should allow
lawyers to assess all the interests in the balance when harm is
likely to flow from client wrongdoing.
(3) RECOGNIZE THE PROFESSION'S RESPONSIBILITY TO
THE PUBLIC
If the legal profession is to retain the privilege of self-
regulation, it must recognize its ultimate responsibility to
the public good. The drafters of the ABA Model Rules noted
the duty of lawyers and the legal profession to serve the
public interest, cautioning against allowing self-interest to
intluence the drafting of ethics rtles.
aproc I- - -neThee legle prfesin' relatiee autonomyr carie
matter how pernicious the client intent and provides no pro- wi"The legal prfession's relative autonomy carries
tection for financial or property interests, no matter how sig- with it special responsibilities or self-government.
nificant. Thus, in an important sense, the continued message i The profession has a responsibility to assure that its
of the rule is that silence is golden. regtlations are conceived in the public interest and not
in firtherance ofparochial or self-inter-(2) TRUST LAWYERS AS DECISION q. ese cnersoDteha...[ - ., st d oncerns of tile bar."-(
MAKERS IS0010
By its inclusion of the recently passed hplicit in the ABA's assessment of its
exceptions, the AIBA moved toward recog- ITihe current rule ties the lawyer's hands responsibility is the fact that legislatures
nizing lawyers as trustworthy deiion- a(both state and federal) possess the power to
nakers. However, the ABA dido n- and belittles the lagoer's role ... regulate the conduct of persons within their
enough in establishing this trust The still jurisdiction, including lawyers, so long as
too absolute tature of Model Rule 1.6 pro- 0 N de legislation stops short of violating the
hibits the lawyer from exercising discre- separation of powers doctrine. Likewise,
tion in i significant number of situations. It leaves the lawyers cannot escape the reach ofthe common law by virtue
lawyer without the right to speak, even when a client crime I of rules of ethics. "The operation oflaw external to the law of
or fraud creates significant risks to others and the lawyer lawyertig,--other law-will sometimes 'firre' firtherexeep-
could face liability from third parties ]or failing to warn lions regardless of what a disciplinary code might say."i
them of dangers.' h Thus, the current rule ties the lawyer's The Ilouse of Delegates embraced its role of serving the
hands and belittles the lawyer's role, making the lawyer public good by recralling the balance relating to confiden-
essentially a functionary without tile power to draw distitc- tiality and disclosure in the exceptions it approved to Rule
tines based on significant risks known to him when the risks 1.6. The reformulation if Model Rule 1.6 adopted by the
threaten significant property or financial loss. ABA I louse of Delegates in February 20102 strikes an appro-
The same analysis that led the House of Delegates to
empower lawyers in the situations of peril to life and bodily
harm also argues for empowering lawyers in situations
where the interests of third parties cletu ly outweigh the inter-
ests of a client who misuses the lawyer's services to commit
a crime or fraud resulting in substantial injury to others.
A possible justification for a categorical nile is that the
person applying the rle lacks the ability to make a reasoned
distinction of the principles that control. A nuanced rule is
harder to apply than a categorical one. 1'hus, when a decision-
maker laces the ability to distinguish between categories, a
categorical nile may be necessary. In tie case of tile lawyer's
duty of confidentiality, la%,ers apply the rule. However,
applying rules is the lawyer's role in life. One of the defini-
tive skills of lawyers is the application of rules, whether sim-
ple or complex. Moreover, deference to the lawyer's decision
seems particularly appropriate in fact-specilie deicrminations
like those lawyers face in situations of peril or the risk ofsig-
priate balance of client interests with the interests of others
when life or bodily integrity weigh in the balance.
Problems remain, however, with regard to the interests
the House of Delegates rejected as insufficient to merit pro-
tection. Issues relating to client crimes or frauds that result
in significant financial or property loss arise in many areas
of law, perhaps most notibwly in environmental violations
and corporate law and finance. The Enron case may provide
examples of the difficult choices lawyers face when clients
engage in fraud or wrongful nondisclosure. In such circuln-
stances, clients who know well the constraints of confiden-
tiality, may coerce lawyers to cover tip wrongdoing or to
facilitate a fraud on the public.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of renewed eltorts by members of the
louse to revert to the former rule on death and bodily harn
is radically out of step with the tradition of confidentiality in
the American legal profession and with tie rules of'profes-
ile P'tOIESSIONAL LAWYER, SPRING 2002
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sional conduct adopted by most states. Such a reversion
would subject lawyers to the risk of liability to non-clients
harmed by client conduct that was known to the lawyer. lie
changes adopted by the House of Delegates offer important
corrections to Rule 1.6 and represent significant progress
toward addrcssing the interests ol' third parties. However,
the rejection of proposed subsection (h)(2) raises qucstions
oflproportiotality and fIirness. It also raises questions relat-
ing it) the ABA's imprimatur of the regulation of lawyers
and the ABA's regard for the lawyers it represents.
ENDNOTES
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i. Honorable E. NonnanV eWscy, the chair of the Ethics 2000
Commission moved the House to consider adoption of the
amendments to the rules as I louse Report 401.
2. The ABA is awaiting a final report by the ABA Commission oil
Mullijurisdictional Practice, which is expected in May of 2002
befhire completing worl on Model Rules 5.5 and 8.5 on unau-
thorized practice of law and disciplinary authority, choice of law,
3. The Commission proposed some change to virtually every
nile or comment to the rule.
4. The proposed revision to Model Rule 1.6 (in legislative for-
mal) provided as follows:
RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTAIITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal infonnation relating to the rep-
resentation of a client unless the client eetteni after eaznstl
l:d: oola, e::.e- . r ti :.j. .: : i!A ::.e gives informed consent.
the disclostre * iimpliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, tnd :tneep :n tnid in or the disclosure ip.
motted paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal **i infobmation rdnting to the rep
-
revtntation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the elzh friei e: 'mi: .g i er ntitat:l lte.
tha:mt tlo I,.; yz R i 1:10;'. w:' ISn Fe: %h ill iff.= fl' n ; l.
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily hatin; tm
(ZLt.0_-prevent die client from committing a crime or
frand that is retsonhly cecilain to result in substantial
iniury to the financial interests or nionetty of another
andin_ rf ligrance of which the client has used or is
usin the lawyer's service
(3) to prevent. mitigate or iectifv substantial initrv to the
inancial interests or property of another that is reason-
ably certain to result or has resulted flora the client's
commission of a crime or fraud in furlh .nc Lich
the client has used the htwyer's serv ices:
(4) to secure lenal advice anbout the lawyer's conmnliance
.with jogRAs
t4-2) to establish a claim or dctlese n behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, it esltahlih a defense toia criminal charge or civil
claim agaitst the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations i
atny proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
of the client; or
.o..comply with other law or a court order.
5. Proposed Model Rule 1.6 (b)(I). For full text, see footnote 4,
sttpra.
6. Itecatse the motion to delete subsection (b)(2) passed by a sub-
stantial majority, the Commission withdrew from consideration
subsection (b)(3), a proposed exception that would have per-
mintted disclosures to protect the interests of third parties. See
footnote 4, .nqura for ie full text of subsections (b)(2) and (3).
7. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 158 (1986) (holding that
the dty of confidentiality does tinot require an attontey to
assist a client's fraud or to allow it to go unpunished).
8. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (stating
that free speech and assembly, "while funtdanental" to
democracy do not mean that people may "address a group at
aty public place and at any time"); American
Communicatiuns Ass'tt v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)
(ooting "clear and present danger" exception to First
Amendment guarantee of free speech); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
9. Some members of the I louse of Delegates proposed retaining
Model Rule 1.6 in essentially its current form despite the fact
the long-standing tradition of the legal system in a confiden-
tiality rule-balancing client interests against those of third
parties and the public.
10. Proposed subsection (b)(5) carries forward verbatim (b)(2)
from tie former rule, empowering lawycrs to protect their
own interests. Although this exception is sometimes called
the "Attorney Self-Defense Exception," it allows lawyers In
use client intbonation to establish a claim as well as a
defense. See, e.g., Daniel It. Fischel, l.awyerx and
Conidentiality, 65 U. Cui. L. REv. 1 (1998) (noting that the
legal profession qtaliftied the "ncar.absolutrc duty of confi-
dentiality" by creating Lie "broad :0f-deiise' exceptint" as
a way of protecting lawyers).
II. See, e.g., United States v. Ilorvath, 731 F.2d 557 (1994).
12. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr,, UnderSheler of Confidentiali,, 50
CAsa1 W. REs. L. REV. 1.3 (1999).
13. Roger C. Cramton and Lori 1. Knowles, l'mfrssiontal Secrecy
and iv Et'cepions: Spaulding it Zinmncrniun Revisited, 83
MtNN. L. REV. 63 (1998).
14. Id. at 107.
15. Id. it 106-07.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROrrssiONAL CONDUCT, Scope, parn. 17
(2002).
17. The exception ti protect lawyers, by contast, presents a lib-
eral rule, allowing disclosure wlhen a lawyer reasonably
belteves it is ncccsary to establish a claim or defense on his
behalf. See discussio above.
18. Geotlrey Hazard made the point at the August meeting oflthe
House of Delegates that lawyers are sied by third parties who
believe that they acted iu concert with clients who commit a
crime or fraud, noting that such clients are "rats." On the issae
of risks to lawyers for failing to disclose client information,
see generally Nathan Crystal, The Latntier': Dua,' to Disehose
Atlerial Fru't in Contract or Settlement Negotiaion., 87
KENTUCKY L.J. 1055 (1998-99)
19. Moreover, the Model Ititles acknowledge lawyer discretion in
the aundling of negotiatiots, case development snd other
areas that depend on lawyers to impose professional decision-
making. Model Rule 1.2 notes that the client has ultimate
authority in deciding "objectives of representation," but that
the lawyer has authority in deterining the scope of the rep-
resentation atd the means fbr achieving the client's objec-
lives. See Model Rule 1.2.
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LAW OF LAWYrkrn o: A HANItnoK ON TMr. Mgpr . Rtit.r.s or
PROuSSIONAL CONDUcr 1.6:109, at 168.1-.2 1
22 TilE PROFESSIONAl .AWVER. SPRINGt 20112
HeinOnline  -- 13 Prof. Law. 22 2001-2002
